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Social Security System in India: An International Comparative Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines selected components of social security system in India and compares them 
with their OECD counterparts. Historically, the Indian policy makers have viewed the pension 
system as a welfare measure and therefore, it lacks in financial professionalism, diversification, 
and in the belief that pension funds can also be treated as an asset. The Indian system is biased 
towards the organized formal sector as workers in this sector are benefitted with the provisions 
under various labor laws. Even then the pension provisions in India are way far behind the 
OECD benchmark. In the unorganized sector, old age income remains mainly confined to 
voluntary savings. The New Pension System although makes the pension amount an old age 
asset, is silent on the social security provisions to the poor. The average income earners are not 
able to replace their pre-retirement earnings with pensions compared to most of the OECD 
countries. In terms of the gross pension wealth, India is nearer to the OECD average only in the 
low income category for men. Out of 5% of health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
government’s share in India accounts even less than 1% which is significantly lower than the 
OECD benchmark.  
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1. Introduction 
A Social Security System (SSS) is one whereby the state provides various benefits to those who 
are unable to provide the same for themselves. Such a system is generally meant to serve the 
socially deprived conditions, such as poverty, old age, disability, and unemployment, etc. The 
most important forms of social security system are retired-worker benefits, and dependents' 
benefits. Therefore, SSS is a means of living independently during the old age and supporting the 
dependents in the family. Individuals while working are expected to set aside a part of their 
income as long term savings to take care of their needs in post-retirement years. Apart from the 
increased cost of living, the steeply rising cost of medical treatments in recent times and the need 
for personalized services in the old age, there are always apprehensions that the savings made 
during the working life will be inadequate unless some institutional arrangements are in place.  
 
Population age structure of an economy plays an important role in deciding the savings 
generation potential of that economy.i In a dynamic economy, the age structure of population 
influences the income growth. With population growth there will be more young people to save 
and their contribution to income growth will be significant. In other words, with larger share of 
younger population who are working, the net savings of the economy will be positive; the 
induced income growth propels total savings at a higher level.  
 
This study tries to assess the existing social security system in India with that of the OECD 
countries. Comparing the demographic features between India and OECD, it is observed that the 
Indian demographic features are better than the overall OECD average and India has a larger 
pool of young population than most of the OECD countries. Potential Support Ratio (PSR) 
stands very high for India meaning that the existing population is very young and in the working 
age group.ii Hence, they have very less number of elderly to support. With Mexico and Turkey, 
the PSR of India stands at 12. On the other hand, the PSR of countries like Japan, Italy, and 
Germany is very low and support the aging argument in these countries.iii The OECD countries 
are graying fast and with weak savings potential their prospects of future growth momentum is 
reaching saturation. On the contrary, the population growth rate in India has declined 
consistently (from 2.25% in 1980-85 to 1.62% in 2000-05) and is estimated to be 0.25% in 2045-
50. Not only that, the life expectancy at the age of 60 is also relatively low (though it has 
  4
improved over the years).iv Therefore, the PSR is relatively high in India compared to the OECD 
countries. But such a demographic advantage also necessitates in having a social security 
provision for the future; because in the future with further improvement in life expectancy the 
share of old age population will increase and thus the potential support ratio may decline.  
 
 
With the opening up of economy the traditional characteristics of Indian labor market have 
changed dramatically. With this not only the organized sector workers have been impacted but 
the unorganized sector workers engaged in export units have also been affected. It is in view of 
such developments that this paper attempts to explore the existing social security system in India 
and draws attention to the issues where the Indian system falls behind the OECD benchmark.  
 
The itinerary of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 traces the debate in extant literature 
in terms of its impact on household saving, economic growth etc. Section 3 provides overview of 
the existing social security system in India. Finally, Section 4 explains how the Indian social 
security system is a laggard compared to its developed counterpart, i.e., OECD countries.  
 
2. Theoretical Issues & Literature Review 
The LCH provides an explanation about the motive of savings in working age in order to dissave 
later for meeting the old age requirements. See, Modigliani et al. (1954, 1963). But this 
hypothesis has been criticized on several grounds.v In particular, the precautionary motive of 
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savings even can force old aged people not to dissave as much as has been depicted by the LCH; 
because they may fear that the future contingency can offset the available level of income. On 
the other hand, because of the liquidity constraints, people cannot smooth out their consumption 
pattern for a long period. The existing literature on social security system has extensively used 
the LCH to analyze and discuss its role and impact over the household savings behavior. Aaron 
(1967), finds that the social security expenditure to national income ratio have a negative 
relationship with the household savings ratio. Feldstein (1974) extended the LCH framework to 
show that presence of social security system decreases personal savings. But Leimer et al. (1982) 
and Eisner (1983) contradict Feldstein (ibid.). According to them, the presence of social security 
in the periods of unemployment enhances the consumption and thus the national income 
increases which in turn reinforces the savings and investment. The literature also provides the 
debate about the influence of age of the social security system on household savings [Feldstein 
(1977) and Kopits et al. (1980)]. The impact of social security on household savings can be 
measured through three effects: income effect, wealth effect and retirement effect.vi Any change 
in benefits or payroll taxes alters the disposable income available with the individuals and thus 
have an income effect. However, the income effect is neutralized in the long-run if the raised 
disposable income is offset by the equivalent increment in payroll taxes. The wealth effect 
indicates the direct savings response of individuals to expected future benefits. It is negative if 
the households feel that in the presence of adequate social security provisions there is less 
savings requirement for future. On the other hand, the wealth effect will be positive if the social 
security program educates the households that it is essential to insure themselves against the old 
age requirements and contingencies like sickness and unemployment (Cagan, 1965). In addition 
to this, the retirement effect affects the savings ratio indirectly as the benefits from retirement 
may induce the individuals to go for early (say, voluntary) retirement than they would in the 
absence of it. Therefore, the retirement effect is positive when the provisions of retirement 
benefits induce the aged worker(s) to drop out from the labor market. However, the relative 
strength of the wealth and retirement effects can be leveled for criticism incorporating the 
possibility of existence of joint family system whereby the working individuals support the 
elderly, non workings and incapables with the hope that they will get the similar support from 
their children in a similar way as they are doing to their dependents.  
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The public pension plans affect the growth of the economy. Denton et al. (1981) report short 
term impact of pension plan outlays on the growth prospects of Canada. They find that 
introduction of a national pension plan temporarily reduces the rate of economic growth. Weil 
(1994) provides evidence from developed economies that the old by providing bequests lowers 
the savings among the young.vii These authors argue that the extent of savings reduction and 
hence the impact on the level of income in the long-run is affected by the nature of aggregate 
savings behavior. Most of the existing empirical studies are focused on advanced countries. Only 
a few have attempted so far to explore the case for some of the developing countries. For 
instance, see Feldstein (1977) and Kopits et al. (1980). But they do not find statistically 
significant results for those developing countries. Ashraf et al. (2003) argue that the strong 
withdrawal side features of saving schemes deter the individuals to go for the future savings. In 
general, the anomalies in savings behavior can be cited to the presence of weak and stagnant 
organized sector in the developing economies.  
 
3. Social Security System in India: An Overview 
With a presence of large unorganized sector, India has not been able to provide a quintessential 
social security cap to all. In India, the World Bank’s three pillar approach of pension system is 
partially followed as there is no minimum guaranteed pension for the participants (hence, the 
first pillar is nonexistent).viii There are various employment linked pension schemes existing in 
India, but they are limited only to the organized segment of the workforce. As against the OECD 
average of mandatory pension schemes of covering population of the age group 15-65 and the 
labor force (which stands to 60.4% and 80.3%, respectively) India stands far behind: it covers 
only 5.7% of population in the age group of 15-65 and 9.1% of the labor force. Workforce 
engaged in unorganized sector has to resort to the third pillar of pension system which is of 
voluntary nature. Hence, the Indian pension system is largely privately managed at individual 
level; Poirson (2007). Since Indian policy makers viewed pension system as a welfare measure, 
it lacked in financial professionalism, diversification, and in the belief that the pension funds 
could be treated as an asset; see, Vaidyanathan (2006). The Indian Social Security System is 
broadly classified as follows:ix (i) Civil Service Pensions; (ii) Statutory Pension Scheme and 
Provident Fund Scheme for the Organized Sector; (iii) Superannuation; (iv) Small Saving 
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Schemes; (v) Pension Schemes and Welfare Funds for the Senior Citizens and Destitute; and (vi) 
Micro Pension Schemes. 
 
The first three Pension provisions are meant for the organized sector workers. The fourth 
component is of special importance because with this instrument the central and state 
governments encourage the households to save and thereby generate funds to finance their debts. 
The interest returns on these funds are generally higher than the market interest rates and some of 
these funds are also tax advantaged. The fifth component is meant for the targeted community in 
the ‘unorganized sector’ including the destitute. Finally, the Micro Pension Schemes designed 
with the UTI and SEWA bank encourage the unorganized sector women worker to save in order 
to meet their old age needs. 
  
3.1 Pension Provisions to the Organized Sector in India 
The government employees in India are entitled to receive the Superannuation Pension and 
Retiring Pension under the various rules of civil services pension schemes. Besides, there are 
provisions for health disability, family pension and even for the employees under (disciplinary) 
penalty. However, new entrants to the central government work force (except the armed forces) 
who have joined after January 2004 have been placed under the New Pension System (NPS) 
which is a Defined Contribution (DC) based pension scheme.x NPS is regarded as India's 
equivalent of the individual retirement accounts in the USA; Asher (2006). On the other hand, 
for the government and private enterprises, social security provision are constitutional and the 
laws enacted in India are: (i)The Employees' Provident Funds & Miscellaneous Provisions (EPF 
& MP) Act, 1952; (ii) The Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Act, 1948; and (iii) The Payment of 
Gratuity Act, 1972. In case of the first one, both the DC and DB schemes are run simultaneously 
to benefit the employees and their families. Similarly, the Employees’ Deposit Linked Insurance 
(EDLI) Scheme, 1976 gives insurance cover to the dependents with the employers’ contribution. 
The ESI Act comprises of DC schemes for the (organized sector) factory workers. These have 
been extended to benefit the workers employed in restaurants, multiplexes, etc. Finally, the 
payment of the gratuity benefit is a statutory requirement for employers and it is applicable to all 
the permanent employees, regardless of their category or salary.  
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3.2 Small Saving Schemes 
The small saving schemes are the saving instruments which the households save for the 
contingencies and future purpose. Barring Post Office Savings and Savings Bank Accounts, in 
general other small saving schemes generate interest yield higher than the interest rate prevailing 
in the market. Public Provident Fund (PPF) because of its long term maturity period is 
considered as a pension scheme similar to the schemes existing for the workers of organized 
sector. These saving schemes are important considering the cyclical nature of income and short 
term contingencies in the unorganized sector.   
 
3.3 Pension Schemes and Welfare Funds for Senior Citizens and Destitute 
These are typically targeted social assistance programs and welfare funds. The pension 
provisions for the elderly of informal sector are: (i) Senior Citizen Saving Schemes (SCSS); and 
(ii) National Old Age Pension Schemes (NOAPS). The SCSS aims to benefit the senior citizens 
by providing them a simple and high yielding channel with a small maturity period and high 
interest return (9%). Easy and premature withdrawal is allowed which caters to the old age 
contingencies. On the other hand, NOAPS is a non-contributory scheme designed particularly for 
the elderly citizens falling below the poverty line and the destitute.  
 
3.4 Micro Pension Schemes 
Micro Pension Schemes are particularly meant for the informal sector women workers. In this 
scheme, the saving is accumulated over a period of time and intermediated through financial and 
capital markets by professional fund managers. At an agreed withdrawal age (usually 58 or 60) 
the accumulated balance can be withdrawn either as a lump-sum amount or phased withdrawals, 
or a combination of the two. SEWA (Self Employed Women Association) is one such scheme 
managed by UTI AMC in which the contribution is made up to the age of 55 and the pension 
starts after 58.  
 
4. Comparison of India Social Security System with the OECD Countries 
This section examines the social security system in India in comparison with the OECD 
countries in terms of the health care expenditure as a percentage of GDP, basic structure of 
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pension schemes in the organized sector, replacement rates, pension wealth and pension asset as 
a percentage of GDP.  
 
4.1 Health Care Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
Expenditure on health care is an important component of social security system. As a percentage 
of GDP we find that India performs far below than its OECD counterparts. Out of 5% of health 
care expenditure as a percentage of GDP, government’s share accounts even less than 1% for 
India. On the contrary, the OECD countries have much better and fair share of government 
expenditure on health care which reflects the sound health care policy in these countries. 
Therefore, one may argue that in terms of providing health facilities to the retired people and 
elderly have-nots the Indian government is not as responsible as the governments of OECD 
countries. See, Fig. 2.   
 
 
4.2 Structure of the Pension Schemes in OECD and India   
The formal sector pension schemes mainly have two tiers; redistributive and mandatory 
insurance. However, there also exist voluntary provisions that contribute towards generating 
savings for the old age. The redistributive part ensures that the pensioners achieve some absolute 
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and minimum standard of retired living. The insurance component of the pension schemes are 
some targeted retirement savings in comparison to the earnings during pre-retirement years. In 
the redistributed tier there are three components ⎯ resource-tested, basic, and minimum 
pensions.xi The second tier (mandatory insurance) consists of Defined Benefit (DB), Defined 
Contribution (DC),xii Notional Accounts (NDC)xiii and Points.xiv Based on these features, 
comparing the pension structure existing in OECD countries and in India, we find that the Indian 
formal sector does not guarantee the redistributive pension. Therefore it lags behind the pension 
system available in the OECD countries. Refer to Table 1. For details, see Pensions at a Glance, 
2007, Pp. 24-25).   
 
4.3 Comparison Based on Replacement Rates 
The old-age pension replacement rate measures how effectively a pension system provides a 
retirement income to replace earnings during the working years, the main source of income 
before retirement. Gross and Net Replacement Ratesxv are the two indicators based on which the 
formal sector pension schemes are compared between India and OECD countries. Table 2 
represents the difference in terms of Gross Replacement Rate (GRR) performances in both the 
domain. Considering the group of average income earners, the GRR in India stands below the 
OECD average in both the sexes’ category. This implies that, in the formal sector the average 
income earners (both men and women) in India are not able to replace their pre-retirement 
earnings with pensions compared to most of the OECD countries (notwithstanding, some notable 
exceptions such as UK, Mexico and Japan). If compared with the OECD average, this also holds 
true for the Indian low income earners (both the sexes). However, on the basis of cross-country 
difference, in India the GRR of the low income category is better than many of the OECD 
countries. For the high income earners, in India the GRR performance is not very encouraging. 
With reference to the Net Replacement Rate, although it is higher than the GRR in all the OECD 
countries as well as in India;xvi but for all categories: low, average and high for both men and 
women, India stands below the OECD average. Refer to Table 3.  
 
4.4 Comparison Based on Pension Wealth 
Pension wealth is considered to be a better indicator than the replacement rates as it includes the 
life expectancy, retirement age, and the indexation of pension benefits that determine for how 
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long the pension benefit must be paid and how its value evolves over time. The Gross Pension 
Wealth (GPW) refers to the magnitude of pension flow. In terms of GPW, while India is nearer 
to the OECD average in the low income category for men, it lags in other income groups for both 
the sexes. Having consistency with the findings on replacement rates, GPW for low income 
category people (both for men and women) in India is better than many of the OECD countries 
on the basis of cross-country differential. India’s relative performance in terms of Net Pension 
Wealth also exhibits the similar trend. Refer to Table 4 & 5, respectively.   
 
4.5 Comparison Based on Financial Depth  
In some of the OECD countries the financial depth (measured as pension asset as a percentage of 
GDP) happens to be more than 100% (e.g., Netherlands, Switzerland and Australia) compared to 
a meager 5.75% in India. It highlights the fact that in the OECD countries the pension provision 
system yield high returns and are well invested. Therefore, in the OECD countries, the returns on 
pension funds are lucrative and the aged have relatively better life in the post-retirement years. 
India’s pension asset as a percentage of GDP though does not look that impressive but is still 
better than some of the OECD countries such as Germany, Italy, Belgium, Czech Republic, and 
France. See, Fig. 3. 
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5. Summary and Conclusion 
In any economy, the social security system is primarily meant to provide protection to elderly 
poor and destitute from economic deprivation. In advanced countries, the social safety net is 
quite wide in terms of its contribution to meet the needs of their elderly population; a large chunk 
of the labor force there is in the organized sector and enjoys the coverage of labor laws. It covers 
the workers and their dependents against the physical (and/or mental) disability, unemployment 
and thus covers the income and health risks. But in the case of India, the lack of such a wide 
social security net does have serious implications for well-being of aged, poor people who are 
unable to meet their old age needs for reasons beyond their control. The incidence of wide-
spread poverty and unemployment make the situation more adverse.  
 
India’s workforce is largely engaged in the unorganized sector where the pension provisions are 
mainly of voluntary nature. In fact, the largeness of this sector is a bottleneck in the social 
security provisions to the elderly poor in India. Though the NPS is a professional move to make 
the Indian social security system in tandem with the international practice, the benefits are likely 
to be carried away by the organized sector workers as they have consistent and regular cash flow 
of income. The targeted assistance and micro pension schemes although caters to the need of old 
age poor and women, are not significant enough to meet the future requirements. In addition, the 
government’s burden of the pension provision with the administered interest rate (which is 
usually high compared to the market rate of interest) makes the government vulnerable to its debt 
sustainability. If we compare the formal sector pension scheme in India with the pension 
provisions practiced in the developed world, it performs far below than the OECD average. The 
Indian formal sector pension scheme does not guarantee the redistributive pension. This makes 
the provision privately managed. It is not surprising that the replacement ratios and pension 
wealth are also not at par with the pension provisions available in the OECD countries. The low 
health care expenditure is an indicator of how much the Indian government has been 
irresponsible towards its people. Finally, the bottom place of India in the pension asset as a 
percentage of GDP pyramid shows that India has to go further in order to professionalize the 
pension schemes.   
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Table 1: Pension Structure in OECD Countries and in India 
First Tier Second Tier 
Universal Coverage, Redistributive Mandatory, Insurance
                   Public Public Private
Countries Resource 
Tested 
Basic Minimum Type Type 
Australia 9   DC 
Austria 9   DB  
Belgium 9  9 DB  
Canada 9  9 DB  
Czech Republic 9 9 9 DB  
Denmark 9 9   DC 
Finland   9 DB  
France 9  9 DB + Points  
Germany 9   Points  
Greece 9  9 DB  
Hungary    DB DC 
Iceland 9 9   DB 
Ireland 9 9    
Italy 9   NDC  
Japan  9  DB  
Korea  9  DB  
Luxembourg 9 9 9 DB  
Mexico  9 9  DC 
Netherlands  9   DB 
New Zealand  9    
Norway  9 9 Points DC 
Poland   9 NDC DC 
Portugal   9 DB  
Slovak Republic   9 Points DC 
Spain   9 DB  
Sweden   9 NDC DB+DC 
Switzerland 9  9 DB DB 
Turkey   9 DB  
United Kingdom 9 9 9 DB  
USA 9   DB  
India    DB+DC  
     
          Sources: OECD Countries, Pensions at a Glance, 2007. 
                        India, Pensions at a Glance: Asia/Pacific Edition, OECD, 2009. 
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        Table 2: Gross Replacement Rates by Individual Earnings Level 
                               Men Women 
Individual Gross Earnings* 
(% average) 
0.5(L)      1(A) 1.5(H) 0.5(L) 1(A) 1.5(H) 
Country       
Australia 67.0 41.6 33.1 67.0 41.6 33.1 
Austria 80.1 80.1 76.4 80.1 80.1 76.4 
Belgium 58.1 42.0 32.5 58.1 42.0 32.5 
Canada 76.5 44.5 29.7 76.5 44.5 29.7 
Czech Republic 79.2 49.7 36.4 79.2 49.7 36.4 
Denmark 124 80.3 67.5 124 80.3 67.5 
Finland 66.5 56.2 56.2 66.5 56.2 56.2 
France 61.7 53.3 48.5 61.7 53.3 48.5 
Germany 43.0 43.0 42.6 43.0 43.0 42.6 
Greece 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 95.7 
Hungary 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 76.9 
Iceland 108.3 90.2 87.5 108.3 90.2 87.5 
Ireland 68.4 34.2 22.8 68.4 34.2 22.8 
Italy 67.9 67.9 67.9 52.8 52.8 52.8 
Japan 47.1 33.9 29.4 47.1 33.9 29.4 
Korea 64.1 42.1 33.6 64.1 42.1 33.6 
Luxembourg 99.4 88.1 84.3 99.4 88.1 84.3 
Mexico 55.3 36.1 34.5 55.3 29.9 28.6 
Netherlands 93.4 88.3 86.6 93.4 88.3 86.6 
New Zealand 77.5 38.7 25.8 77.5 38.7 25.8 
Norway 66.2 59.3 49.8 66.2 59.3 49.8 
Poland 61.2 61.2 61.2 49 44.5 44.5 
Portugal 63.0 53.9 53.1 63.0 53.9 53.1 
Slovak Republic 56.4 56.4 56.4 56.4 56.4 56.4 
Spain 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 81.2 
Sweden 76.6 61.5 75.6 76.6 61.5 75.6 
Switzerland 62.5 58.3 40.5 62.8 59 41 
Turkey 86.9 86.9 86.9 86.9 86.9 86.9 
United Kingdom 51.0 30.8 21.3 51.0 30.8 21.3 
United States 50.3 38.7 34.1 50.3 38.7 34.1 
India 67.1 40.4 31.3 65.6 39.0 30.0 
OECD 72.2 59.03 54.26 71.3 57.79 53.02 
 ∗ L stands for Low Income Group, A stands for Average Income Group and H stands for High Income Group.  
 All values are in percentage. 
  
Sources: Pensions at a Glance, 2009; Pensions at a Glance, 2009, Asia/Pacific Edition. 
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Table 3: Net Replacement Rates by Individual Earnings Level 
                      Men    
 
Women 
Individual Net Earnings* 
(% average) 
0.5(L)     1(A) 1.5(H) 0.5(L) 1(A) 1.5(H) 
Country       
Australia 80.2 53.1 41.8 80.2 53.1 41.8 
Austria 90.5 90.3 86.3 90.5 90.3 86.3 
Belgium 78.7 63.7 51.7 78.7 63.7 51.7 
Canada 89.1 57.9 40.0 89.1 57.9 40.0 
Czech Republic 95.3 64.1 49.4 95.3 64.1 49.4 
Denmark 137.0 91.3 82.7 137.0 91.3 82.7 
Finland 73.2 62.4 63.8 73.2 62.4 63.8 
France 76.2 65.7 60.2 76.2 65.7 60.2 
Germany 59.2 61.3 60.3 59.2 61.3 60.3 
Greece 113.6 110.8 106.7 113.6 110.8 106.7 
Hungary 94.3 105.5 99.2 94.3 105.5 99.2 
Iceland 110.1 95.1 92.1 110.1 95.1 92.1 
Ireland 68.4 40.1 30.3 68.4 40.1 30.3 
Italy 74.8 74.8 77.1 76.6 58.1 59.9 
Japan 51.4 38.7 33.9 51.4 38.7 33.9 
Korea 68.8 46.6 38.7 68.8 46.6 38.7 
Luxembourg 107.1 96.5 93.5 107.1 96.5 93.5 
Mexico 56.0 38.0 39.6 56 31.5 32.8 
Netherlands 105.0 103.2 98.6 105.0 103.2 98.6 
New Zealand 79.3 41.1 29.0 79.3 41.1 29.0 
Norway 76.7 69.3 60.6 76.7 69.3 60.6 
Poland 74.4 74.9 75.0 60.6 55.2 55 
Portugal 73.2 69.6 72.0 73.2 69.6 72.0 
Slovak Republic 66.3 72.7 74.9 66.3 72.7 74.9 
Spain 82.1 84.7 85.3 82.1 84.7 85.3 
Sweden 79.3 64.1 81.2 79.3 64.1 81.2 
Switzerland 68.8 64.5 44.3 69.1 65.3 44.9 
Turkey 121.2 124.7 127.1 121.2 124.7 127.1 
United Kingdom 63.8 40.9 29.2 63.8 40.9 29.2 
United States 57.9 44.8 39.5 57.9 44.8 39.5 
India 76.3 46.4 38.8 74.5 44.4 35.8 
OECD 82.4 70.3 65.5 82.0 68.9 64.0 
 
∗ L stands for Low Income Group, A stands for Average Income Group and H stands for High Income Group.  
 All values are in percentage. 
 
Sources: Pensions at a Glance, 2009; Pensions at a Glance, Asia/Pacific Edition, 2009.          
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Table 4: Gross Pension Wealth 
                     Men    
 
Women 
Multiple of Average 
Gross Earnings* 
0.5(L)     1(A) 1.5(H) 0.5(L) 1(A) 1.5(H) 
Country       
Australia 11.7 6.9 5.3 13.7 8.1 6.2 
Austria 12.2 11.6 10.5 14.2 13.5 12.1 
Belgium 8.9 6.4 5.0 10.3 7.5 5.8 
Canada 11.7 6.8 4.5 13.6 7.9 5.3 
Czech Republic 12.1 7.6 5.6 14.3 9.0 6.6 
Denmark 18.5 11.6 9.6 21.3 13.3 11.0 
Finland 10.4 8.8 8.8 12.3 10.5 10.5 
France 10.8 9.3 8.5 12.5 10.8 9.8 
Germany 7.2 7.2 7.1 8.5 8.5 8.4 
Greece 14.3 14.3 14.3 16.6 16.6 16.6 
Hungary 12.4 12.4 12.4 15.4 15.4 15.4 
Iceland 17.0 13.7 13.2 19.1 15.4 14.8 
Ireland 12.1 6.1 4.0 14.5 7.2 4.8 
Italy 10.0 10.0 9.9 10.7 10.7 10.7 
Japan 7.8 5.6 4.9 8.8 6.3 5.5 
Korea 8.9 5.9 4.7 10.7 7.0 5.6 
Luxembourg 21.7 19.2 18.4 26.5 23.5 22.5 
Mexico 7.3 4.8 4.6 8.9 4.8 4.6 
Netherlands 17.2 16.3 16.0 20.1 19.1 18.7 
New Zealand 14.3 7.2 4.8 16.8 8.4 5.6 
Norway 11.4 10.2 8.5 13.4 11.9 9.9 
Poland 8.4 8.4 8.4 9.5 8.6 8.6 
Portugal 9.2 8.1 8.0 10.7 9.5 9.3 
Slovak Republic 8.8 8.8 8.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Spain 12.2 12.2 12.2 14.3 14.3 14.3 
Sweden 12.2 9.9 12.0 14.0 11.3 13.7 
Switzerland 10.7 9.8 6.8 13.1 12.0 8.3 
Turkey 11.0 11.0 11.0 12.9 12.9 12.9 
United Kingdom 6.8 4.1 2.9 7.8 4.7 3.3 
United States 7.2 5.5 4.9 8.3 6.4 5.7 
India 10.2 6.2  4.8  10.9  6.6  5.1  
OECD  11.5 9.3 8.5 13.4 10.9 9.9 
 
∗ L stands for Low Income Group, A stands for Average Income Group and H stands for High Income Group.  
 
Sources: Pensions at a Glance, 2009; Pensions at a Glance, Asia/Pacific Edition, 2009. 
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Table 5: Net Pension Wealth 
                      Men    
 
Women 
Multiple of Average 
Net Earnings* 
0.5(L)     1(A) 1.5(H) 0.5(L) 1(A) 1.5(H) 
Country       
Australia 11.7 6.7 4.8 13.7 7.8 5.5 
Austria 10.9 8.8 7.4 12.6 10.1 8.5 
Belgium 8.9 5.7 4.1 10.3 6.6 4.8 
Canada 11.7 6.7 4.5 13.6 7.8 5.2 
Czech Republic 12.1 7.6 5.6 14.3 9 6.6 
Denmark 12.7 7.8 6.1 14.6 8.9 7 
Finland 9 6.6 6.2 10.6 7.9 7.3 
France 10.2 8.2 7.1 11.7 9.4 8.2 
Germany 6.6 5.8 5.3 7.8 6.8 6.3 
Greece 14.3 12.3 11.1 16.5 14.3 12.9 
Hungary 12.4 11 9.5 15.3 13.6 11.7 
Iceland 13.9 10.2 9.3 15.6 11.4 10.5 
Ireland 12.1 6.1 4 14.5 7.2 4.8 
Italy 7.6 7.6 7.5 10.7 8.1 8.1 
Japan 7.1 5.2 4.4 7.9 5.8 4.9 
Korea 8.9 5.8 4.6 10.6 6.9 5.5 
Luxembourg 19.2 15.2 13.3 23.5 18.5 16.3 
Mexico 7.3 4.8 4.6 8.9 4.8 4.6 
Netherlands 14.2 12.1 11 16.6 14.2 12.8 
New Zealand 11.8 5.9 3.9 13.9 6.9 4.6 
Norway 10.3 8.4 6.8 12.1 9.9 7.9 
Poland 7.2 7 6.9 8.3 7.2 7.1 
Portugal 9.2 8.1 7.8 10.7 9.5 9.1 
Slovak Republic 8.8 8.8 8.8 10.6 10.6 10.6 
Spain 10.9 10.1 9.7 12.8 11.8 11.3 
Sweden 9.3 7.1 8 10.6 8.1 9.1 
Switzerland 10.4 7.9 5.5 12.7 9.6 6.7 
Turkey 11 11 11 12.9 12.9 12.9 
United Kingdom 6.8 4 2.8 7.8 4.6 3.2 
United States 7.2 5.5 4.9 8.3 6.4 5.7 
 India 10.2 6.2  4.8  10.9  6.6  5.1  
OECD 10.5 7.9 6.9 12.3 9.2 8.0 
 ∗ L stands for Low Income Group, A stands for Average Income Group and H stands for High Income Group.  
 
 Sources: Pensions at a Glance, 2009; Pensions at a Glance, Asia/Pacific Edition, 2009. 
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Endnotes 
 
i See, the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) of consumption behavior in Dornbusch et al. (2005), Ch.13. 
 
ii The potential support ratio is the number of people in the age group of 15-64 per one older person aged 65 and 
above. This ratio describes the burden placed on the working population by the non-working old population. 
 
iii Among the developed countries, PSR of the Netherlands is still high even though its life expectancy at birth and 
life expectancy at 60 is significantly high. 
 
iv See, for details World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision and AARP International, 2008.  
 
v See, Barro (1974), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1997) and Banks et al. (1998), among many others. 
 
vi See, Feldstien (1977).  
 
vii Weil (ibid.) while examining both micro and macro level data on young households that have either received or 
expected bequests, confirms that bequests are an important factor in determining the magnitude of the savings by 
young. 
 
 
viii   The World Bank Three Pillar approach advocates that the first pillar pension system should have non 
contributory, publicly managed and tax financed social insurance (popularly known as basic pension). The second 
pillar pension system should be contributory and privately managed (popularly known as mandatory pension). 
Finally, the third pillar pension system should be of voluntary saving nature.  
 
 
ix A more segregated classification can be found in Asher (2006). 
 
x The pension schemes prior to this were Defined Benefit (DB) system indexed with inflation.   
 
xi Resource-tested programs grant a higher benefit to poorer pensioners and lower benefit to the better offs. The 
benefit depends upon income from other resources and acquired as well as inherited assets. Basic pension schemes 
are independent of income and the amount is paid either at a flat rate or it depends on the number of years of 
contribution. Minimum pensions provide higher benefit on the income of particular pension entitlement.  
 
xii In DB, the pensioner’s amount depends on the number of contributions made throughout the working life. In DC, 
contributions flow into an individual account and the accumulation of contributions and investment returns is 
usually converted into a pension income stream at retirement. 
 
xiii Notional Accounts (or Notional Defined Contribution) are the schemes which record each worker’s contributions 
in an individual account and apply a rate of return to the account. The accounts are ‘notional’ because in that both 
the incoming contributions and the interest accrued to them exist only on the books of the managing institution. See, 
OECD Pensions at a Glance, 2007 for details.  
 
xiv Workers earn their Pension Points based on their individual earnings for each year of contributions.  
 
 
xv Gross Replacement Rate is the ratio of pension over final earnings before retirement. The indicator shows the 
pension benefit as a share of individuals’ lifetime average earnings. The Net Replacement Rate is defined as the 
individuals’ net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement earnings, taking account of personal income taxes 
and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners.  
 
xvi The personal tax system plays an important role in old-age support. Pensioners often do not pay social security 
contributions and, as personal income taxes are progressive and pension entitlements are usually lower than earnings 
before retirement, the average tax rate on pension income is typically less than that on earned income. Moreover, 
most of the times income tax systems give preferential treatment either to the pensioners by giving additional 
allowances or credits to older people. Therefore, net replacement rates are usually higher than gross replacement 
rates. See, for details Pensions at a Glance, Special Edition: Asia-Pacific, 2009, p.32.  
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